BOOK REVIEWS by unknown
BOOK REVIEWS
Formative Influences of Legal Development, Evolution of Law Series, VoL 3.
Compiled by Albert Kocourek and John H. Wigmore. Boston, Little, Brown &
Co. I918. pp. xxiv, 705.
The Evolution of Law Series has been completed by the publication of selected
readings under the designation of Formative Influences of Legal Development.
The first two volumes of the Series were noticed in this JOURNAL, Vol. XXV, 164.
The object of the Series was there summarized as to inquire how and why legal
institutions have developed and taken the characteristic forms shown in all
systems of law. In the Preface to the Volume now noticed the Editors say that
the greatest utility of the subject, by which they apparently mean the practical
application of the study of law from the evolution standpoint, "lies in the
possibility of applying the laws of legal evolution to the problems of the present
day and in forecasting the immediate future movement of social forces." This
is certainly no mean ideal for juristic science. This proposition assumes, of
course, that law does evolve, develop, grow, that in itself it is organic, its suc-
cessive phases being due to change from within, and that this evolution takes
place according to fixed principles, and that the subject matter which, in the
last analysis, is the rules of conduct of human beings in society, is controlled
in its changes by these supposed laws; that is, that the law of the lawyer, which
relates solely to human conduct in some form, is itself subject in its changes to
some other and higher law fixed and unchangeable in its character; otherwise
-there can be no forecasting as distinguished from a more or less intelligent
guessing. There is certainly contained here also an assumption that is not in
principle different from one view of the theory of natural law. The Editors,
however, are not oblivious of the implications and possible difficulties necessarily
involved in their proposition, for in another place they say: "If the method by
which the law has grown is more akin to an unconscious process rather than a
voluntary, reasoned and consciously selected development, then it must be
apparent that the function of human reason, in the midst of other phenomena,
has an autonomy which is at least highly limited, if not actually fictitious. As to
all this, however, the cautious reader will judge for himself."
We must confess to some interest in the question whether the use of the term
"Evolution" as applied to the history and transformation of law is not vague
or merely metaphorical or actually misleading. Is it law merely in its collective
sense as rules of conduct that the legal evolutionist has in mind, is it the highly
abstract term "law," or is it some permanent quality or qualities of the human
mind, implanted at creation and not acquired, in the nature of a sub-conscious
universal instinct in devising and adopting rules of conduct? "History is not a
progress taking place of itself where human beings are only interested spectators;
it is made up precisely of human actions; it is created by man. If history in
general has this character the history of law in particular can have no other.
Human actions constitute the chief important factor in it. (Korkunov, Theory
of Law, 163.) Is law, the law, a law, simply a product of human minds in social
relations, and can we, in any accurate sense, talk about the evolution of the
product, either as an abstraction or as a specific rule, as though it were some
independent entity organic in quality, having within itself any power of change
whatever? Is it not rather true, as Tarde says, in Volume II of the Series, p. 44:
"The law called national appears to have not the least tendency to 'evolute,' it
only seems inclined to sit still"? Perhaps it would be truer to say that law as
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law has no "tendency" whatever, any more than a quantity of bricks has a
tendency to become a house. Strictly it never changes, but is changed from
without; it does not develop, but it is developed. For instance, who with any
regard to the correct use of language would say that our Connecticut Revision
of the Statutes of 1875 has evoluted, developed or grown into the three-fold
larger Revision of i918? Metaphorically these expressions may be used. But
exact reasoning cannot be based upon metaphor. The Statutes have not grown;
the Legislature has changed them. In view of the loose and metaphorical way in
which the term "evolution" has come to be used, perhaps it is not very material
to dwell upon this point further than that, if there is anything in it, the use of the
terms evolution, growth, as describing the changes taking place in a subject
matter that in itself is incapable of any change whatever, becomes misleading,
and the arguments based upon it lead nowhere. The only active element causing
change lies, not in law itself, but in the action of the human mind, creating,
modifying, discarding ideas of that class collectively denominated law.
May it not be true that one reason why much juristic literature does not appeal
to so many lawyers of undoubted mental grasp lies in this very fact,-that law is so
often discussed upon the implicit assumptions that in itself it is something
permanent, organic, outside the human mind; instead of being simply a general
term for a limited group of human ideas, no one of which, specifically, is either
permanent, organic, or has any sort of an existence apart from the creative mind,
and no one of which has any practical content except what the mind has first
put into it, and this content endures only so long as the mind remains fixed in
its attitude? Other than this, law is a pure formal abstraction, devoid of con-
tent except as a colorless definition supposed to characterize all and all manner
of laws, from the first appearance of law to the present, and even as an abstrac-
tion its form is by no means agreed to by the original legal thinkers. In short,
that thing which sbme of the jurists appear to assume as the basis of their
speculations, has no reality to one engaged in the administration or the creation
of the actual jural rules in force in any given jurisdiction. As we once heard
a very distinguished Judge say of a certain jurist: "I do not understand what he
is talking about."
We do not wish to be understood as in any way minimizing the value of the
compilation here noticed, nor as saying that the articles selected are generally
subject to serious criticism on the ground just discussed. This and the other
books in the Series we regard of very great value indeed if too much is not
expected of them. They contain in convenient form material for juristic study
not easily accessible to most lawyers. As to the present book we would say
that its articles are worth serious consideration, stimulating to thought, and that
they treat the subject in an ideal and theoretic way, not altogether neglectful of
the practical side, far removed from the plane of every-day practice. It intro-
duces us to a wide variety of views, some inconsistent, held by students and
thinkers of great ability, upon various forces under which given laws have been
adopted. The writers are from different nationalities. The United States, Eng-
land, Germany and Belgium furnish five each, France and Italy three each, Spain
and Switzerland one each. They all agree upon the necessity of observation of
what has taken place as distinguished from a priori reasoning. The Volume is
divided into groups of articles by authors of repute and some of them of renown.
A section discusses the criteria of legal evolution, meaning the adoption of some
basis of appraisement of the ideas compared. A second, and indeed the main
part, is devoted to a series of what are practically monographs upon the different
leading factors bearing upon the determination of the content of the law. These
are classified as geophysical, economic, biologic, racial, religious, psychologic,
political and social. The third and last part is upon the process of legal evolu-
tion. The one side of the subject inadequately, in fact hardly at all, touched
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upon is the vital and all-important human side involving reason and will. In
some cases great stress is laid. upon primitive and savage institutions, apparently
with the notion that thus, from law in its infancy, a principle can be derived
which will help to forecast %.hat may take place in the realm of law in the
immediate future. We wish it might be. The world would place upon its
loftiest pinnacle of fame that person who, to-day, with the help of principles
derived from the so-called evolution of law, would be able to forecast the events
in the field of law within the next few years.
As an isolated illustration we notice that,. in the Chapter on criteria, some
twenty-six pages are devoted to the institution of Ambilian marriage, or mar-
riage where the husband enters the wife's family, among the Malayan peoples in
Sumatra. The resulting claimed demonstration is that this form of marriage
must necessarily have come into existence, given all the factors operating among
the Ambilian peoples of Sumatra. This does not seem to be a very fruitful
principle; it is confined to the Ambilian peoples themselves as a constant
quantity, besides the factors that have been discussed, and then assumes that
even with them no other result could have happened. It does not tell what other
peoples or races would have done under similar circumstances. This statement
appears to be hardly more than a form of the logical law of identity "whatever
is, is" with the implied addition " and it could not have been otherwise," which
neglects entirely the human element in the equation.
No one in these days will question the influence of the factors named as ele-
ments leading to the determination of what law shall be or is at any given period.
The important point, however, is that the being upon whom these factors exert
their influence is not some invisible, intangible entity called law, but a volitional
being, a being, having mind, will, the power, within certain physical limits, of choice,
and law is the result of this choice reacting to given conditions. With this free-
dom of choice, to reach a real unalterable guiding principle, the question becomes
one of determining why an individual or a people think as they do and not
otherwise, as they conceivably might. But in a book notice we cannot go at all
into the numerous problems raised by the articles. How far these volumes will
promote the purposes of utility the Editors have stated may be questioned. The
articles incorporated in the collection are, however, of great value as promoting
the intelligent comprehension of the order of succession of known legal institu-
tions and they make clear the enormous complexity of the process which
results in any given system of law at any given time. They help to bring order
out of the accomplished facts of history, to arrange them in their true order, and
trace, not their evolution, but their transformation by the action of human
beings. It is quite one thing to reason out a plausible explanation of what men,
with their power of choice, have already done, and quite another to say how
this power of choice will be exercised in the future. Quoting from Picard on
the last page of the book, "History is full of guesses and hypotheses. Some are
verified; others are found to be false and disappear, but Law's activity never
tires and never exhausts itself." If, instead of personifying the law, we should
say in its place, "The human mind, acting in the field of law, never tires and
never exhausts itself," the statement would be quite accurate.
EDwiN B. GAGi.
The Law of War and Contract. By H. Campbell. London, Humphrey Milford;
New York, Oxford University Press. 1918. pp. xx, 365. $6.oo.
The author of this work, who holds a judicial position in Bombay, has given
us an intelligent and helpful review of more than 350 cases dealing with the
law of contract as' affected by war. A half dozen of these are American cases
of no very recent date; the rest are almost wholly English, coming down as
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late as September, 1917, more than 2oo of them arising out of the present great
war.
The subject matter falls entirely within the two headings Illegality and
Impossibility. These are made the titles of two separate chapters; but they are
equally as much involved in the other chapters. Contracts made with enemies
during time of war are first dealt with, including resident enemy aliens and cor-
porations with enemy shareholders. Next is considered the effect of war upon
valid contracts between parties who became enemies after the making of the
contract and upon valid non-enemy contracts. The operative effect of war and
its incidents (e. g. government requisition) is considered with respect to con-
tracts wholly- executory and contracts partly performed; upon contracts con-
taining so-called "war clauses" providing for "restraint of princes," "force
majeure," and the like, and contracts containing no such clause; upon contracts
classified under such common headings as Bills of Lading, Charter-parties,
Sales of Goods, Insurance, Agency, and Bills of Exchange.
In dealing with impossibility the author follows the terminology and the
reasoning of the courts implicitly, with the usual confusion as to conditions
precedent and conditions subsequent, and making no distinction between impossi-
bility of performing in accordance with duty and impossibility of fulfillment of
a condition precedent to duty. This is especially apparent in the presentation of
the coronation cases. Purely constructive conditions are described in terms of
fiction as being tacitly intended by the parties. The courts might now much
better adopt the doctrines of the Indian Contract Act, declaring impossibility a
good defense in the absence of any showing as to the intention of the parties,
and providing for a quasi-contractual recovery where the impossibility occurs
after a beneficial part performance. There is a full presentation of those numer-
ous cases where "impossible" shades off into "impracticable" with a tendency
even to become "economically unprofitable." The existing variation may be
laid largely to -the existence of "war clauses" in some contracts and not in
others.
The last chapter deals with emergency legislation, including D. 0. R. A. but
not the moratorium.
The litigation dealt with in this volume is of a sort already existing in the
United States, and there will no doubt be much more of it as an aftermath of
war. .The present volume will be of considerable assistance to American lawyers
by making the experience of the English courts easily available.
AiRTina L. CormIN.
